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Privacy Beyond Possession:
Solving the Access Conundrum in
Digital Dollars
ABSTRACT
The advent of a retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) could
reshape the US payments system. A retail CBDC would be a digital
representation of the US dollar in the form of an account or token that
is widely accessible to the general public. It would be a third form of US
fiat money that is created and issued by the Federal Reserve and
complementary to physical cash. CBDC proposals have suggested a
myriad of retail CBDC design models with an overwhelming interest in
a retail CBDC that either implements a centralized ledger system or
some form of a distributed ledger system to process payments. The
technology of a retail CBDC would enable instantaneous payments
for consumers and greater transparency for government officials.
Additionally, CBDC proponents are championing retail CBDC as a tool
to promote financial inclusion. However, antiquated US privacy
protections may be inadequate to safeguard against the potential risks
to individual privacy within digital payments and consequently
undermine financial inclusion. A retail CBDC system that is under the
control of the Federal Reserve could bolster regulatory compliance and
oversight but also exacerbate workarounds by government entities in the
current US privacy framework that are concerning for individual
privacy in the age of big data and dataveillance. A proper privacy
framework governing retail CBDC records would alleviate risks to
privacy and enhance public trust in a retail CBDC system. Refining the
Privacy Act of 1974 or creating a new regulatory framework that is
informed by both the Privacy Act and the impact of innovative data
analytics would help balance the inherent tension between privacy and
transparency of user identity and transactions within a retail CBDC
system under the control of the Federal Reserve.
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Central banks around the world have undertaken various roles
in promoting innovative digital payment solutions to advance several
objectives, including financial inclusion and efficiency.1 Relatedly, the
rise of cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, has demonstrated the need for
a resilient digital currency in the global economy. Yet, the proliferation
of cryptocurrency has sparked concerns about competition from private
currencies and the privatization of monetary policy.2 In 2019, Facebook
was met with legislative and regulatory scrutiny when it announced a
plan to develop Libra3—a price-stabilized cryptocurrency (also known
as stablecoin) whose value is tied to a set of existing government-issued
currencies.4 COVID-19 has further highlighted the shortcomings of
antiquated financial systems and accelerated central banks’ exploration

1.
See Michael S. Barr, Adrienne A. Harris, Lev Menand & Wenqi (Michael) Xu, Building
the Payment System of the Future: How Central Banks Can Improve Payments to Enhance
Financial Inclusion 23–27 (Univ. of Mich. Ctr. on Fin., L. & Pol’y, Working Paper No. 3, 2020).
2.
See John Crawford, Lev Menand & Morgan Ricks, FedAccounts: Digital Dollars, 89
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113, 115 (2021) [hereinafter FedAccounts].
3.
Clare Duffy, Facebook Gets More Official Pushback on Libra, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/03/tech/facebook-libra-us-lawmakers/index.html [https://perma.cc
/M5UR-N72A] (last updated July 9, 2019, 4:28 PM).
4.
See LIBRA ASS’N MEMBERS, WHITE PAPER V2.0, at 2 (2020), https://wp.diem.com/enUS/wp-content/uploads/sites/23/2020/04/Libra_WhitePaperV2_April2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
4PVQ-KFPS]. Libra Coins consist of a multicurrency coin and single-currency stablecoins. Id.
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of innovative payment solutions, most notably central bank digital
currency (CBDC).5
Specifically, central banks are exploring the concept of retail
CBDC (or general purpose CBDC), which would be a digital form of fiat
currency that is created and issued by a country’s monetary authority,
the liability of the monetary authority, and widely accessible to the
general public.6 A retail CBDC would function as an additional option
to physical cash. This form of digital currency would modernize the US
banking infrastructure by leveraging innovative technology to extend
access to central bank money. The United States is confronting the need
to reform its banking system not only to move towards a technologically
advanced future and address lingering financial inclusion issues but
also to join the global exploration of CBDC. The COVID-19 Pandemic
(particularly the prolonged delay of stimulus payments) has
demonstrated the clear need for critical government infrastructures to
expand the functionality and utility of the dollar.7 The US financial
system currently excludes 6.5 percent of US households from the
mainstream banking system (the unbanked population) and fails to
serve the financial needs of 18.7 percent of US households (the
underbanked population).8 A retail CBDC could alleviate barriers to

5.
See Paul Wong & Jesse Leigh Maniff, Comparing Means of Payment: What Role for a
Central Bank Digital Currency?, FEDS NOTES (Aug. 13, 2020), https://doi.org/10.17016/23807172.2739 [https://perma.cc/V9BQ-E7G9] (“The COVID-19 pandemic has also led central banks to
think further about potential enhancements to the general safety and efficiency of payment
systems, including developing a digital currency”); see also Caitlin Reilly, Delayed COVID-19 Aid
Spurs Search for Faster Payments, ROLL CALL (June 23, 2020, 6:59 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/
2020/06/23/delayed-covid-19-aid-spurs-search-for-faster-payments/
[https://perma.cc/JL4SQAKJ].
6.
CODRUTA BOAR & ANDREAS WEHRLI, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BIS PAPERS NO.
114, READY, STEADY, GO? – RESULTS OF THE THIRD BIS SURVEY ON CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL
CURRENCY 4 (2021) [hereinafter BIS SURVEY].
7.
Chris Brummer, Agnes N. Williams Rsch. Professor & Fac. Dir., Georgetown
Inst. of Int’l Econ. L., Remarks at Digital Dollar Live, at 12:07 (July 21, 2020),
in ACCENTURE, https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-130/Accenture-Digital-Dollar-LiveVideo-Transcript.pdf#zoom=50 [https://perma.cc/U8DD-GNNT]; see also OUSMÈNE JACQUES
MANDENG & JOHN VELISSARIOS, ACCENTURE, THE (R)EVOLUTION OF MONEY II: BLOCKCHAIN
EMPOWERED CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES 4 (2019), https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-105/Accenture-Revolution-of-Money-II-2019.pdf#zoom=50
[https://perma.cc/VUN6ZME3].
8.
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2017 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND
UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 17 (2018), https://www.economicinclusion.gov/downloads/2017_
FDIC_Unbanked_HH_Survey_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZ5M-DRZ3] (finding that 6.5 percent
of households were unbanked and 18.7 percent of households were underbanked in 2017).
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participation in the US financial system by expanding access to the
money supply or serving as a springboard to quality financial services.9
According to a survey conducted in 2020 by the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS), nearly 86 percent of the sixty-five
central banks that responded are exploring CBDC to some extent.10
Central banks are examining retail CBDC for various motivations,
including financial stability, monetary policy implementation, financial
inclusion, efficiency in domestic and cross-border payments, and the
safety and robustness of payments.11 Countries all over the world have
undertaken CBDC exploration projects at different stages of research
or development.12 Among these projects include the monetary
authorities of the Bahamas, China, and Sweden. In October 2020, the
Central Bank of the Bahamas launched the world’s first “live”
nationwide retail CBDC in the form of its Sand Dollar.13 The People’s
Bank of China issued the first pilots of its digital yuan, formerly known
as Digital Currency Electronic Payment (DCEP), in April 2020.14 The
first DCEP pilots processed over three million transactions, totaling
more than RMB 1.1 billion ($162 million USD).15 The Sveriges
Riksbank initiated its e-krona project in response to the declining use
of cash and is performing pilot tests of payment, deposit, and transfer
capabilities for the e-krona.16

9.
See FedAccounts, supra note 2, at 125–30; ACCENTURE & DIGIT. DOLLAR FOUND.,
THE DIGITAL DOLLAR PROJECT: EXPLORING A US CBDC 13 (2020) [hereinafter THE
DIGITAL DOLLAR PROJECT], https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5e16627eb901b656f2c174ca/t/
5f0c5d052d6235002637d0f6/1594645769165/Digital-Dollar-Project-Whitepaper_vF_7_13_20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4TEK-39S6].
10.
BIS SURVEY, supra note 6, at 6.
11.
Id. at 6–8.
12.
Id. at 6.
13.
Id. at 3; see also Sebastian Sinclair, Central Bank of Bahamas Launches Landmark
‘Sand Dollar’ Digital Currency, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/central-bank-of-bahamaslaunches-landmark-sand-dollar-digital-currency [https://perma.cc/94AG-DFGV] (last updated
Oct. 21, 2020, 9:50 AM).
14.
Ada Hui, China Central Bank Official Reveals Results of First Digital Yuan Pilots,
COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/china-central-bank-official-reveals-results-of-first-digitalyuan-pilots [https://perma.cc/8N83-37U3] (last updated Oct. 9, 2020, 11:32 AM).
15.
Id. (“The digital wallets processed . . . digital yuan transactions between April and
August when the pilots launched and ended . . . making it the most widely used central bank
digital currency (CBDC) in a commercial setting.”).
16.
Rafaela Lindeberg & Ott Ummelas, Sweden Explores Moving to a Digital Currency,
BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-11/sweden-explores-the-feasibility-of-moving-to-a-digital-currency [https://perma.cc/ZDF3-AR45] (last updated Dec. 30, 2020, 9:04
AM).
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Relative to other countries, the United States has been slow to
embrace the concept of digital currency.17 As of this writing, the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System18 has not announced any
plans to launch a CBDC in the near future, but it has shifted its position
on CBDC from one of skepticism to one of insistence in remaining “on
the frontier of research and policy development regarding CBDCs.”19
Federal Reserve Banks are now actively researching CBDC and
relevant technologies.20 The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston is
collaborating with the Digital Currency Initiative at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology on a multiyear project exploring the use of
technologies to test a hypothetical CBDC,21 and the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York established an innovation center via an initiative
with the Bank for International Settlements to explore relevant trends
and fintech developments.22
The decision to issue a retail CBDC is driven by both domestic
circumstances23 and seeming pressure for central banks to stay at the
forefront of innovation.24 The issuance of a US retail CBDC is almost
inevitable given the rapid digitalization of the global economy and the
ever importance of the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency.25 The
issuance of other sovereign digital currencies presents the opportunity

17.
Billy Bambrough, The U.S. ‘Falling Behind’ on Digital Dollar, FORBES (July 22, 2020,
4:52 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2020/07/22/the-us-is-falling-behind-ondigital-dollar/?sh=61b7082420e9 [https://perma.cc/9U7U-PJGQ].
18.
The Federal Reserve System is the US Central Bank and is composed of three key
entities: the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, twelve Federal Reserve Banks, and the Federal
Open Market Committee. Structure of the Federal Reserve System, FED. RSRV., https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/structure-federal-reserve-system.htm
[https://perma.cc/SVS2-9X23]
(last updated Mar. 3, 2017). The use of “Federal Reserve” in this Note refers to the Federal Reserve
System. See id.
19.
See Lael Brainard, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., An Update on
Digital Currencies, Speech at the Federal Reserve Board and Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco’s Innovation Office Hours (Aug. 13, 2020), in FED. RSRV., https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20200813a.htm [https://perma.cc/4A7B-SS4T].
20.
See id.
21.
See id.
22.
See id.
23.
BANK OF CANADA, EUR. CENT. BANK, BANK OF JAPAN, SVERIGES RIKSBANK, SWISS
NAT’L BANK, BANK OF ENG., BD. OF GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS. & BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES: FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES AND CORE FEATURES 2 (2020)
[hereinafter BIS CBDC REPORT], https://www.bis.org/publ/othp33.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD7TQT9V].
24.
Jason Brett, Why Chris Giancarlo Considers a Digital Dollar Mission Critical for the
World, FORBES (Apr. 26, 2020, 2:31 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbrett/2020/04/26/whychris-giancarlo-considers-a-digital-dollar-mission-critical-for-the-world/?sh=2b6c131d3c41
[https://perma.cc/WJZ3-898Z].
25.
See id.; THE DIGITAL DOLLAR PROJECT, supra note 9, at 31–32.
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for sovereign states to bypass the global banking system or compete
with the US dollar for global prominence.26 The Federal Reserve is
seemingly on the path to eventually issuing a retail CBDC in the
future.27 Furthermore, the Biden-Harris administration—particularly
given the appointment of federal agency heads who are proponents of
digital currency28—may accelerate the issuance of a retail CBDC in an
effort to reassert US global governance.29 The maintenance of the US
dollar’s prominence as a currency in the global economy also comes with
additional responsibility in designing and implementing a US retail
CBDC because a US digital currency would likely set the stage for
the global community.30 Therefore, the digital transformation of the
world demands a resilient US digital payments infrastructure that
provides immediacy and integration between payments and digital
services—both domestically and internationally—and also ensures
cybersecurity, privacy, and reliability.31
CBDC offers many benefits but also presents unique risks.
CBDC would strengthen the traceability of money and offer financial
regulators greater control, transparency, and oversight.32 A CBDC
26.
See THE DIGITAL DOLLAR PROJECT, supra note 9, at 32; see also Brett, supra note 24.
27.
See Brainard, supra note 19.
28.
See Michael J. Casey, Money Reimagined: Letter to President Biden, COINDESK,
https://www.coindesk.com/money-reimagined-letter-to-president-biden [https://perma.cc/FH5LFYR7] (last updated Jan. 22, 2021, 4:46 PM) (reporting on “Biden’s crypto gang”).
29.
See George Ingram, Renewing US Global Engagement in a Changed World,
BROOKINGS (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/01/12/renewing-usglobal-engagement-in-a-changed-world/ [https://perma.cc/67XD-8ZTZ].
30.
See Sharon Bowen, Former Comm’r, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n,
Remarks at Digital Dollar Live, at 24:31 (July 21, 2020), in ACCENTURE https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-130/Accenture-Digital-Dollar-Live-Video-Transcript.pdf#zoom=50
[https://perma.cc/U8DD-GNNT]; Sheila Warren, Head of Blockchain & Data Pol’y, Member of the
Exec. Comm., World Econ. F., Remarks at Digital Dollar Live, at 29:02 (July 21, 2020),
in ACCENTURE https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-130/Accenture-Digital-Dollar-LiveVideo-Transcript.pdf#zoom=50 [https://perma.cc/U8DD-GNNT]; see also Tim Alper, Fed Chief Bets
That US’s ‘First-Mover Advantage’ in CBDC Race Is Stronger than China’s, CRYPTONEWS (Jan. 15,
2021), https://cryptonews.com/news/fed-chief-bets-that-us-s-first-mover-advantage-in-cbdc-race8913.htm [https://perma.cc/8RJ9-YU9C].
31.
See generally Fabio Panetta, Member, Exec. Bd. of the Eur. Cent. Bank, Speech at the
Deutsche Bundesbank Conference on the “Future of Payments in Europe” (Nov. 27, 2020), in
EUROOPAN KESKUSPANKKI, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2020/html/ecb.sp201127~
a781c4e0fc.fi.html [https://perma.cc/9MM9-EQ5K] (explaining how digital transformation has
impacted consumer demands).
32.
See Sarah Allen, Srdjan Capkun, Ittay Eyal, Giulia Fanti, Bryan Ford, James
Grimmelmann, Ari Juels, Kari Kostiainen, Sarah Meiklejohn, Andrew Miller, Eswar Prasad, Karl
Wüst & Fan Zhang, Design Choice for Central Bank Digital Currency: Policy and Technical
Considerations 11–13 (Glob. Econ. & Dev. at Brookings, Working Paper No. 140, 2020) [hereinafter
Brookings Paper], https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Design-Choices-forCBDC_Final-for-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7SE-3QJB].
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could provide the Federal Reserve a real-time, panoramic view of the
financial system and bolster data sharing between government entities
for regulatory interests, such as preventing money laundering.33
Conversely, the enhanced visibility provided by a CBDC also poses a
concern for individual privacy. What data will be collected by a CBDC?
Who will have access to CBDC data? How will CBDC data be used?
Moreover, a CBDC could be programmable—such that government
officials can embed code in a retail CBDC that will enable them to see
transactional history or other insights regardless of who directly
operates the system.34 Consequently, government officials could utilize
a retail CBDC as a policy tool for economic benefit while also
undertaking measures that may encroach on individual privacy if there
is no clear boundary in place that limits use of retail CBDC data. The
wide adoption of a retail CBDC necessitates serious consideration of
privacy concerns to foster public trust in the system.35 Although CBDC
could leverage privacy-enhancing technologies to promote trust in the
system, legal choices can further enhance trust in a CBDC amid
regulatory obligations by providing parameters in the collection, access,
and use of retail CBDC data.
This Note examines the inherent tension between privacy and
transparency of user identity and transactions within a retail CBDC
operated by the Federal Reserve. A retail CBDC would generally grant
the Federal Reserve unprecedented access to personal information
and financial data, and thereby implicate material privacy concerns.
This Note suggests that the Privacy Act of 1974 be applied to CBDC
records and refined in several ways to protect individual privacy or
alternatively, a new regulatory framework informed by the Privacy Act
be adopted to directly respond to the rising privacy demands of a retail
CBDC. Part I discusses general technical aspects of a retail CBDC,
provisions of the Privacy Act, key financial privacy laws, and current
anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism
33.
See id. at 63–64. See generally Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Glob. Head of Fin. Crime
Threat Mitigation & Grp. Gen. Manager, HSBC, Remarks at the Central Bank of the Future
Conference: Panel No. 4—Anti-Money Laundering and Financial Inclusion (Oct. 2, 2019), in UNIV.
OF MICH. CTR. ON FIN. L. & POL’Y, http://financelawpolicy.umich.edu/central-bank-of-the-futureconference [https://perma.cc/7X8H-WH7M] (providing ways AML practices can be improved,
including “understanding from a high definition view of what is the probability that someone poses
a high financial crime risk. Zoom in and understand where there is risk and pinpoint it and take
appropriate actions.”).
34.
See Brookings Paper, supra note 32, at 64–66; see also BANK OF ENG., CENTRAL
BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY: OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND DESIGN 45–46 (2020),
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/paper/2020/central-bank-digital-currency-opportunities-challenges-and-design.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6FX-B3FP].
35.
Bowen, supra note 30, at 33:30.
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(AML/CFT) jurisprudence and regulatory practices. Part II examines
the efficacy of the Privacy Act’s protections and identifies shortcomings
of the Act in consideration of potential use cases of retail CBDC records,
vulnerabilities for non-US citizens and non-US permanent residents,
and government information-sharing practices under the Act’s routine
use exception. Part III suggests that retail CBDC records would likely
constitute a “system of records” under the Privacy Act but necessitate
stronger privacy protections that go beyond the mere possession of
information in order to prevent use cases of big data that would
undermine individual privacy in a retail CBDC and consequently
thwart freedom of expression and freedom of association. It proposes
either (1) amending the Privacy Act to balance the government’s
vantage point in a retail CBDC or (2) creating a new privacy framework
informed by the Privacy Act that responds to the privacy demands of a
retail CBDC under the control of the Federal Reserve. It recommends
amending the Privacy Act to (a) expressly protect individuals who are
noncitizens or nonpermanent residents of the United States, (b)
prescribe permissible uses of retail CBDC records and implement a
tiered access approach to the disclosure of CBDC records, (c) limit the
routine use exception to protection under the Act in the context of a
retail CBDC to prevent backdoor access to invasive government
surveillance and unwarranted disclosure of individual records, (d)
bolster procedural requirements for access to retail CBDC records, and
(e) impose more stringent liability provisions for the misuse of retail
CBDC records. This approach would strike a proper balance between
privacy and transparency by preserving some expectation of individual
privacy from needless government surveillance while permitting
regulatory innovation and legitimate law enforcement actions.
I. INNOVATION AND PRIVACY IN DIGITAL PAYMENTS
A. What Is Central Bank Digital Currency?
Central bank digital currency is a digital form of fiat currency
created and issued by a central bank.36 Fiat money, such as the US
dollar, is a currency that lacks intrinsic value and is declared a legal
tender by government decree. Currently, the Federal Reserve issues
two forms of fiat money—physical cash (banknotes)37 and reserves (or

36.
See BIS SURVEY, supra note 6, at 4.
37.
See FED. RSRV. SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS
134–35 (10th ed. 2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/pf_complete.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M4QX-9MHA]. Coins are not liabilities of the Federal Reserve Banks. Id. The
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“wholesale” CBDC).38 Physical cash is a liability of the Federal Reserve
and distributed to the general public through depository institutions.39
The general public can hold demand deposits at depository institutions
(bank accounts) from which physical cash can be obtained.40 Unlike
physical cash, deposits are direct liabilities of the issuing
intermediary.41 Conversely, reserves held at the Federal Reserve are
exclusive to qualified financial institutions and government entities.42
A retail CBDC would be a third form of fiat money that is a liability of
the central bank, complements physical cash, and can be made
available to the general public through digital wallets or deposits held
at the central bank or a financial intermediary depending on the policy
choices of a CBDC.43
A retail CBDC is an opportunity to transform the dollar and US
payments system. Innovative digital payment platforms, such as
Venmo, have reshaped consumer expectations and normalized cashless
transactions. Venmo is a peer-to-peer mobile payments application that
offers users the ability to link their bank accounts, debit cards, or credit
cards to a Venmo account (or digital wallet) from which users can
transfer funds to other Venmo accounts.44 Unlike Venmo, where a user
must transfer funds from a financial intermediary to conduct
transactions on the application, a CBDC could represent these funds. A
CBDC would remove a step in the payment process by eliminating the
transfer (information exchange) between financial intermediaries. The
Federal Reserve could promote the realization of CBDC’s slated
opportunities by serving as a provider of a secure and resilient
payments infrastructure that is widely accessible to the general
public.45
Retail CBDC proposals have included various concepts with
different design choices.46 Retail CBDC can take the form of two
United States Mint issues coins and sells them to the Federal Reserve Banks, which in turn, sell
them to depository institutions. Id.
38.
See Laura Hopper, Does the Federal Reserve Print Money?, FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS
(Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.stlouisfed.org/open-vault/2017/november/does-federal-reserve-printmoney [https://perma.cc/X34A-NCW6]; BIS CBDC REPORT, supra note 23, at 4.
39.
“Federal Reserve notes in circulation are liabilities of the Federal Reserve Banks and
are collateralized by the assets of the Reserve Banks.” FED. RSRV. SYS., supra note 37, at 134.
40.
See THE DIGITAL DOLLAR PROJECT, supra note 9, at 26.
41.
FED. RSRV. SYS., supra note 37, at 134.
42.
See FedAccounts, supra note 2, at 115–16.
43.
See BIS SURVEY, supra note 6, at 4.
44.
What Is Venmo?, VENMO, https://help.venmo.com/hc/en-us/articles/221011388-Whatis-Venmo- [https://perma.cc/7F9U-VKH2] (last visited Mar. 21, 2021).
45.
See BIS CBDC REPORT, supra note 23, at 1.
46.
Brookings Paper, supra note 32, at 10–11.
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technical designs: “accounts” or “tokens.”47 An account is a
representation of money in the form of electronic ledger entries.48
An account-based CBDC would be a demand deposit account49
denominated in CBDC and use a centralized ledger system.50 The
centralized ledger system would rely on a central authority (i.e., the
Federal Reserve or a financial intermediary) to authorize CBDC
transactions and control a ledger that records CBDC account
balances.51 For example, FedAccounts is an account-based CBDC
proposal that offers the general public (US citizens, residents, and
domestically domiciled businesses and institutions) the option to hold
accounts at the Federal Reserve.52 FedAccounts would differ from
standard bank accounts in that they are fully sovereign base money
and possess no fees or minimum balances, interest on balances, instant
in-network payments, and no interchange fees.53 For the purposes of
this Note, an account-based CBDC possesses the aforementioned
qualities of a FedAccount; and conversely, is available to all persons in
the United States that satisfy Know Your Customer standards.
In contrast, a token is a bearer instrument.54 A token-based
CBDC could operate using distributed ledger technology (DLT).55
Blockchain technology is mentioned in several CBDC proposals and is
popularly known for facilitating Bitcoin transactions.56 For example,
the Digital Dollar Project is a token-based CBDC proposal that offers a
tokenized dollar accessible to all persons in the United States. The
proposed example would be fully fungible with Federal Reserve notes
and reserves, potentially use a DLT-informed infrastructure, utilize the
existing two-tiered banking system, and possess the potential for
additional programmable capabilities.57 For the purposes of this Note’s

47.
See id.; see also WORLD ECON. F., CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY POLICY-MAKER
TOOLKIT 9 (2020) [hereinafter WEF TOOLKIT], http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_CBDC_
Policymaker_Toolkit.pdf [https://perma.cc/875R-5RBM].
48.
See FedAccounts, supra note 2, at 124; KEVIN WERBACH, THE BLOCKCHAIN AND THE
NEW ARCHITECTURE OF TRUST 30 (2018).
49.
Brookings Paper, supra note 32, at 10–11.
50.
See id.
51.
See id. at 19–22.
52.
FedAccounts, supra note 2, at 116, 122.
53.
Id. at 122–23.
54.
See WERBACH, supra note 48, at 9 (explaining that cash is a bearer instrument, as it
is valuable in itself).
55.
Brookings Paper, supra note 32, at 11.
56.
See WEF TOOLKIT, supra note 47, at 10–11. See generally THE DIGITAL DOLLAR
PROJECT, supra note 9, at 11, 18 (explaining the tokenization of the dollar and distributed ledger
technology).
57.
See THE DIGITAL DOLLAR PROJECT, supra note 9, at 7–12, 18.
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analysis, a token-based CBDC possesses the aforementioned qualities
of the Digital Dollar Project proposal, but conversely, it uses a
decentralized network under the control of the Federal Reserve
notwithstanding how the CBDC is distributed to the general public.
Like token-based CBDC, account-based CBDC could also use a
permissioned blockchain. A retail CBDC could also use different types
of DLT or non-DLT solutions.58
Due to current regulatory objectives, such as anti-money
laundering compliance, it is unlikely a retail CBDC would be
untraceable and enable complete anonymity like cash. The
Congressional Research Service has conceded that a CBDC that allows
absolute anonymity would be inconsistent with the current anti-money
laundering regime.59 Therefore, a retail CBDC—whether account-based
or token-based—would not enable complete cash-like transactions
because a CBDC would undoubtedly use a compliant ledger-based
system.60
1. The Process of Payments
The key distinction between accounts and tokens is the payment
verification process.61 An account-based CBDC payments system would
verify the identity of the account holder to circumvent identity theft.62
In comparison, a token-based CBDC payments system would
authenticate the validity of a token to avoid potential “electronic
counterfeiting.”63 Additionally, the process of payments depends on the
type of ledger technology (centralized versus distributed) of a CBDC.
Currently, retail payments between account holders at different
banks use an automated clearing house (ACH) for the clearing and
settlement of payments.64 An ACH is a centralized system that clears
and settles transfers between depository institutions.65 “Clearing” is the

58.
See Brookings Paper, supra note 32, at 12–24.
59.
MARC LABONTE, REBECCA M. NELSON & DAVID W. PERKINS, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
IF11471, FINANCIAL INNOVATION: CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES 2 (2020).
60.
See BANK OF ENG., supra note 34, at 47 (“[A]ny CBDC would need to be compatible
with AML obligations, ruling out truly anonymous payments.”).
61.
See COMM. ON PAYMENTS & MKT. INFRASTRUCTURES & MKTS. COMM., BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS, CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES 4 (2018) [hereinafter COMM. ON PAYMENTS],
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d174.pdf [https://perma.cc/R453-XYXZ].
62.
See id.
63.
See id.
64.
FedNow Service: Frequently Asked Questions, FED. RSRV., https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fednow_faq.htm [https://perma.cc/MN3F-7SM4] (last updated Aug. 6,
2020).
65.
Id.

832

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 23:4:821

process of receiving and reconciling information about a payment and
can include additional activities such as a fraud screening.66
“Settlement” is the process of debiting and crediting account balances
to transfer funds.67 An ACH essentially connects the separate ledgers
of different payment providers.68 This results in delayed transfers and
other significant inefficiencies.69 Additionally, the Federal Reserve has
a centralized payments infrastructure (real-time gross settlement
(RTGS))70 that processes interbank transfers (not retail payments) in
real time.71 Therefore, it is unnecessary for the Federal Reserve to rely
on DLT for an account-based CBDC.72 An account-based CBDC could
use the Federal Reserve’s RTGS system and offer instantaneous
payments.73
Alternatively, a retail CBDC could use a distributed ledger
system to facilitate transactions.74 DLT enables a “shared state”
between network participants without a central authority.75 A series
of smart contracts could be the mechanism to reconcile and complete
the transfer of digital currency between users.76 Smart contracts
are computer code (or software programs) that execute instructions
on a blockchain.77 A smart contract verifies the legitimacy of the
transaction.78 If conditions of the transfer are met, the transaction will
be recorded in the ledger and completed.79 For example, user A initiates
a promise that she will send a certain amount of bitcoin to user B. The
transfer of bitcoin constitutes a contractual agreement (a specification
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
See id.
69.
See FedAccounts, supra note 2, at 130–32.
70.
See id.; Lael Brainard, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Delivering
Fast Payments for All, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Town Hall (Aug. 5,
2019), in FED. RSRV., https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20190805a.htm
[https://perma.cc/EZS5-ZD9D].
71.
See FedAccounts, supra note 2, at 130–32; see also COMM. ON PAYMENTS, supra note
61, at 7.
72.
Helen Partz, European Central Bank Execs Explain Why CBDCs Don’t Need
Blockchain, COINTELEGRAPH (Sept. 21, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/european-centralbank-execs-explain-why-cbdcs-don-t-need-blockchain [https://perma.cc/35CF-VGVP].
73.
See FedAccounts, supra note 2, at 130–32.
74.
See WEF TOOLKIT, supra note 47, at 10–11.
75.
See WERBACH, supra note 48, at 64.
76.
See id. at 63–64.
77.
Id.
78.
See Josh Stark, Making Sense of Blockchain Smart Contracts, COINDESK,
https://www.coindesk.com/making-sense-smart-contracts [https://perma.cc/85HP-WGTP] (last
updated June 7, 2016, 4:48 PM).
79.
WERBACH, supra note 48, at 63–64.
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of rights and obligations).80 A smart contract ensures that user A does
not renege on her promise to transfer bitcoin to user B by synchronizing
the rights and obligations of the transfer (i.e., the amount of bitcoin) to
execute the contractual agreement between user A and user B.81
2. Smart Money and Digital Privacy
A retail CBDC could leverage DLT (or numerous, trusted
variations) to become “smart” money.82 Smart money would be
programmable and allow the Federal Reserve (or other government
entities) precise control over a retail CBDC.83 A retail CBDC could be
non-fungible (unlike physical cash) to the extent that different
capabilities are programmed into the CBDC.84 Additionally, a retail
CBDC would likely use a permissioned decentralized network. A
permissioned decentralized network would enable the Federal Reserve
to control who has access to the retail CBDC network, regulate the
activity of CBDC users, and specify the terms under which the system
grants shared access to transaction information for certain CBDC
network participants.85 For instance, the Federal Reserve could permit
other governmental entities access to CBDC transaction data, or it
could utilize smart contracts in a retail CBDC to receive certain insights
that inform regulatory oversight.86 On the other hand, the precise
control over CBDC could also aid in the inappropriate surveillance
discussed in Part III. The programmability of a retail CBDC offers
endless possibilities but poses major risks for privacy in the absence of
a proper privacy framework.
This Note focuses on a US retail CBDC that uses either a
centralized ledger system or a permissioned decentralized system
under the control of the Federal Reserve—particularly to the extent
that the Federal Reserve is the central authority of CBDC records. This
includes a CBDC system that requires the Federal Reserve to engage
in recordkeeping, such as CBDC accounts directly held at the Federal
Reserve; CBDC accounts held as “pass-through”87 accounts at a
80.
Id.
81.
Id.
82.
See Brookings Paper, supra note 32, at 47–48, 64–68; see also BANK OF ENG., supra
note 34, at 41–42, 45–46.
83.
See Brookings Paper, supra note 32, at 64–65; see also BANK OF ENG., supra note 34,
at 45–46.
84.
See Brookings Paper, supra note 32, at 64–65.
85.
See WERBACH, supra note 48, at 60.
86.
See id.
87.
See Banking for All Act, S. 3571, 116th Cong. § 3 (2020) (as introduced by Sen. Sherrod
Brown) (defining pass-through accounts).
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financial intermediary; a CBDC token that is implemented on a ledger
directly accessible by the Federal Reserve; and more broadly, a CBDC
token that is programmable (i.e., embedded supervision via smart
contracts)88 by the Federal Reserve. It will exclusively address the
inherent tension between individual privacy and financial integrity
standards within a retail CBDC. Although a third party could manage
regulatory due diligence for a retail CBDC system under the control of
the Federal Reserve, such an arrangement would not preclude the
Federal Reserve’s direct access to financial records in its ledger or
through generated insights. This Note will not discuss technical
granularities of a retail CBDC, privacy-enhancing technologies, or
cybersecurity.
B. The “Expectation” of Financial Privacy
Retail CBDC will inevitably generate a digital financial
footprint given the incidence of transaction records. What this digital
financial footprint reveals about individuals could implicate material
privacy concerns. The scale of recordkeeping in a retail CBDC could
amass a wide range of personal information and financial data into a
system of records. Theoretically, this could result in government access
to personal information that invades individual privacy. Thus, the
successful implementation and wide adoption of retail CBDC requires
a revised privacy framework to account for technological advancements.
1. Fair Information Practices: Privacy Act of 1974
Presently, the Federal Reserve is subject to the Privacy Act of
Congress enacted the Privacy Act to curb unwarranted
invasions of individual privacy by federal agencies.90 The Act was
drafted in response to the increased use of information systems within
government operations.91 Innovations in computerized databases
enabled federal agencies to easily cross-reference an individual’s
personal information and potentially compile various personal details
1974.89

88.
See Brookings Paper, supra note 32, at 47–48, 64–68; see also BANK OF ENG., supra
note 34, at 41–42, 45–46.
89.
5 U.S.C. § 552a; 12 C.F.R. § 261a (2020).
90.
See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a) (“The purpose of this Act [enacting this section and provisions set out
as notes under this section] is to provide certain safeguards for an individual against an invasion
of personal privacy”).
91.
See id.
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about an individual in a database.92 The Privacy Act governs the
collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personally
identifiable information93 contained in a system of records by federal
agencies.94 The Act allows US citizens and permanent residents to bring
civil actions against the federal government for violations of the statute
and provides for civil damages.95 Note, the Act only protects US citizens
and permanent residents, and therefore, undocumented immigrants
and nonimmigrants (F-1 visa students, B1/B2 business visitors or
tourists, K-1 visa fiancées, and individuals with temporary protected
status) have no recourse under the Act for invasive government
information practices.96 The Act also imposes criminal penalties (a
misdemeanor and a fine not more than $5,000) on (1) agency officers or
employees who knowingly and willfully disclose information to an
unauthorized person or agency, (2) agency officers or employees who
willfully maintain a system of records in violation of notice
requirements, and (3) any person who knowingly and willfully requests
or obtains any record about an individual from an agency under false
pretenses.97
A federal agency is permitted to maintain in its records only
personal information that is relevant and necessary to accomplish the
purposes of the agency, a statute, or an executive order.98 Subsection
(a)(3) of the Act defines “maintain” as synonymous with “maintain,
collect, use, or disseminate.”99 “Record” refers to any type of information
maintained on an individual, such as financial transactions.100 Notably,

92.
See The Privacy Act of 1974, EPIC, https://epic.org/privacy/1974act/ [https://perma.cc/
5GEQ-9DGJ] (last visited Mar. 17, 2021) [hereinafter EPIC] (explaining the history of the Privacy
Act of 1974).
93.
See Memorandum from Clay Johnson III, Acting Dir., Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, to
Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies, M-06-15, Safeguarding Personally Identifiable Information
(May 22, 2006), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2006/m06-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/952G-KGAS] (“[Personally identifiable information] can be used to
distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, either alone or when combined with other personal or
identifying information that is linked or associated with a specific individual.”).
94.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552a; see also Privacy Act of 1974, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST.: OFF. OF
PRIV. & CIV. LIBERTIES, https://www.justice.gov/opcl/privacy-act-1974 [https://perma.cc/QDH9ZQQY] (last updated Jan. 15, 2020).
95.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(g); see EPIC, supra note 92.
96.
See EPIC, supra note 92.
97.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(i).
98.
Id. § 552a(e).
99.
Id. § 552a(a)(3).
100.
Id. § 552a(a)(4) (“[T]he term ‘record’ means any item, collection, or grouping of
information about an individual that is maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, his
education, financial transactions . . . or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying
particular assigned to the individual”).
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a “system of records” is a database “under the control of any agency”
from which information is retrieved by a personal identifier, such as a
name.101 Hence, retail CBDC records under the control of the Federal
Reserve would likely constitute a “system of records” maintained by the
Federal Reserve pursuant to the Privacy Act and therefore be subject
to protection.
Federal agencies possessing personally identifiable information
must provide safeguards for confidentiality and follow procedural
requirements to permit access to the information.102 In the absence of
an enumerated exception under the Act, federal agencies are prohibited
from disclosing any record contained in a system of records to third
parties or other agencies without the written request or prior written
consent of the individual to whom the record concerns.103 One of these
exceptions is for a “routine use.”104 Federal agencies must publish a
notice in the Federal Register when establishing a new system of
records and describe, among other things, the nature of the records
maintained in the system and each routine use of the records (including
“categories of users and purpose of such use”).105 Law enforcement
agencies (e.g., the CIA, FBI) can also exempt themselves from many of
the Act’s requirements.106
Despite notice and consent requirements, the “routine use”
exception has been criticized for allowing a great amount of
disclosures.107 Routine use is the disclosure of a record for a purpose
that is “compatible” with the purpose for which the information was
collected.108 The meaning of “compatible” is vague but can encompass
“functionally equivalent uses and other uses that are necessary and
proper.”109 Hence, agencies can establish a broad routine use that
includes every potential use of data as long as the routine use is
compatible with, rather than identical to, the purpose for which the
information is collected.110 This has been criticized as enabling “mission
creeps” for a system of records by allowing agencies’ expansions of

101.
See id. § 552a.
102.
See id.
103.
Id. § 552a(b).
104.
See id. § 552a(b)(3).
105.
Id. § 552a(e)(4).
106.
See id. § 552a(j)–(k).
107.
See EPIC, supra note 92.
108.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7).
109.
Guidance on the Privacy Act Implications of Call Detail Programs, 52 Fed. Reg.
12,990, 12,993 (Apr. 20, 1987).
110.
See EPIC, supra note 92.
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routine uses that go beyond intended purposes over time.111
Additionally, agencies may disclose records indicating a potential
violation of law under the routine use exception to law enforcement
agencies for the purposes of investigation or prosecution (despite the
purpose for which the records were collected).112
2. Strictly Confidential Tax Records
The Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) information-sharing policy
with the Social Security Administration (SSA) is a notable example of
a policy choice that advances the IRS’s objectives by limiting
government information-sharing practices. The IRS provides individual
taxpayer identification numbers (ITINs) to individuals who do not have
or are ineligible for a social security number.113 Thus, undocumented
immigrants can file taxes with the IRS with an ITIN despite
unconventional circumstances of their employment.114 The IRS is
permitted to share certain information about individual earnings to the
SSA for the purpose of determining each worker’s entitlement to social
security benefits.115 However, the SSA is prohibited from sharing that
information with others, including the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), despite its law enforcement purpose.116 IRS officials
have previously expressed that sharing tax information with DHS
would decrease tax collection and compliance; and moreover, such a
practice would generally discourage individuals from complying with
tax laws.117 Although sharing information with DHS would aid its
enforcement efforts, this interest does not warrant denying privacy
protections for many individuals.118

111.
112.

See id.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3); see also OFF. OF PRIV. & CIV. LIBERTIES, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST.,
OVERVIEW OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (2020).
113.
Beverly Bird, Filing Taxes as an Undocumented Worker, BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/undocumented-immigrant-taxes-rules-and-requirements-4778580 [https://perma.cc/
GF74-2UDD] (last updated Jan. 16, 2021).
114.
See id.
115.
Jennifer Chang Newell, Will Immigration Authorities Use Our Taxes to Go After
Immigrants?, ACLU (Apr. 23, 2018, 5:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/deportation-and-due-process/will-immigration-authorities-use-our-taxes-go
[https://perma.cc/DA33SFX7].
116.
Id.
117.
Id.
118.
Id.
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3. Financial Integrity
Unraveling the inherent tension between privacy and
transparency in a CBDC requires determining the permissible level of
anonymity within financial transactions. Generally, physical cash
provides the highest degree of privacy because it allows peer-to-peer
transactions between parties without the facilitation of an intermediary
or any recordkeeping of transactions in a ledger. The untraceable
nature of cash enables a significant level of anonymity, which can also
aid illicit and illegal activities, such as money laundering, tax evasion,
and the financing of terrorism.119 Conversely, cash held in a bank
account creates a digital footprint (i.e., account holdings and
financial transaction data) that is visible to the bank and potentially
accessible by the government. A retail CBDC would similarly enable
recordkeeping of financial transactions while also allowing the federal
government unprecedented access to individual financial information
through the elimination of a third-party intermediary.
The Federal Reserve will undoubtedly adhere to existing
financial laws and regulations to ensure the integrity of a CBDC. All
financial institutions operating within the United States are subject to
the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA).120 The BSA requires financial
institutions to assist in preventing and detecting money laundering,
countering the financing of terrorism, and detecting suspicious
activities.121 Banks are required to file currency transaction reports for
cash transactions over $10,000 in one business day122 and file suspicious
activity reports for questionable activities.123 In 2001, following the 9/11
attacks, the BSA was amended by the PATRIOT Act.124 Title III of the
PATRIOT Act requires US banks to develop a Customer Identification
Program to curb the financing of terrorist organizations.125 Banks must
verify a customer’s identity, suitability, and risks before opening new

119.
See Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli, Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, Itai Agur, Anil Ari,
John Kiff, Adina Popescu & Celine Rochon, Casting Light on Central Bank Digital Currency, IMF
Staff Discussion Note, at 20, SDN/18/08 (Nov. 12, 2018); see also Money Laundering, FATF,
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/faq/moneylaundering/ [https://perma.cc/D6QC-GJKP?type=image] (last
visited Mar. 21, 2021).
120.
Bank Secrecy Act, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/bsa/index-bsa.html
[https://perma.cc/NMP4-53VD] (last visited Mar. 21, 2021).
121.
See Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5311, amended by USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No.
107-56, tit. III, 115 Stat. 272, 296 (2001).
122.
See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2021).
123.
Id. § 1010.320
124.
USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. III, 115 Stat. 272, 296 (2001).
125.
See id.
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bank accounts and maintain Customer Identification Program records
for five years after an account is closed.126 These customer due diligence
rules are also known as Know Your Customer laws; they are intended
to protect banks from being used for criminal activity by allowing banks
to collect and analyze personally identifiable information to screen and
create customer profiles.127 Therefore, bank records are “private” in the
sense that they are not readily available to others. However, the degree
of privacy in bank records is limited under the current rule of law.
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)—a
bureau of the US Department of the Treasury—is charged with
implementing, administering, and enforcing compliance with the
BSA.128 FinCEN’s duties and powers include serving as the Financial
Intelligence Unit of the United States, maintaining an accessible
database of financial transaction information, determining trends and
methods in financial crimes, and analyzing and sharing information to
support law enforcement investigations at the federal, state, local,
and international levels.129 The agency has numerous data-access
Memoranda of Understanding with federal, state, and local
law enforcement and regulatory agencies. The Memoranda of
Understanding grant direct access to FinCEN’s BSA data through the
FinCEN portal. The FinCEN portal houses the FinCEN Query search
engine—a tool similar to Google, which enables users to access and
easily analyze up to eleven years of FinCEN data.130 Users can apply
filters and narrow search results, access enhanced data, and import
lists of data (i.e., names, ID numbers, and addresses) to be used as
criteria.131 FinCEN’s Query search application is part of an ongoing
effort to modernize the implementation of the BSA.132

126.
See 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220.
127.
Bank Secrecy Act, supra note 120.
128.
31 U.S.C. § 310.
129.
See id.
130.
Support of Law Enforcement, FINCEN, https://www.fincen.gov/resources/law-enforcement/support-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/9VA7-YKJK] (last visited Mar. 21, 2021); Press
Release, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, FinCEN Query Now Available for Authorized Users: IT
Modernization Program Is on Schedule and Within Cost (Sept. 10, 2012), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/news_release/20120910.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LTF-LSSZ]; FIN . CRIMES
ENF’T NETWORK, FACT SHEET: THE FINCEN PORTAL (2021), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/Facts_FinCENPortal.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KQ3-SWJ9].
131.
See THE FINCEN PORTAL, supra note 130.
132.
See FinCEN’s IT Modernization Efforts, FINCEN, https://www.fincen.gov/fincens-itmodernization-efforts [https://perma.cc/7S5K-7ZJQ] (last visited Mar. 17, 2021).
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4. Is There a Right to Financial Privacy?
In United States v. Miller, the Court held that there is no
legitimate expectation of privacy in bank records under the Fourth
Amendment.133 The Court concluded that bank records are not
confidential information but rather “negotiable instruments” that
contain information voluntarily provided to banks.134 Additionally, the
Court acknowledged that Congress, in enacting the BSA, assumed the
lack of a legitimate privacy expectation in bank records and intended
banks to engage in recordkeeping because bank records are useful to
criminal and regulatory investigations and proceedings.135 Miller
solidified the third-party doctrine, which provides that an individual
has no “reasonable expectation of privacy” in information that she
voluntarily shares with a third party and, therefore, lacks Fourth
Amendment protection against warrantless search and seizure of this
information.136 This Note will not further discuss the application of the
Fourth Amendment to a retail CBDC; however, it is worth highlighting
that Congress and the Supreme Court have already struck a balance
between privacy and BSA compliance that permits some intrusion of
privacy for federal objectives.
In response to the Miller case, Congress enacted the Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (RFPA) to protect customer financial
records from federal government scrutiny.137 The RFPA creates a
statutory Fourth Amendment protection for bank records by requiring
federal government authorities seeking customer financial records
from a financial institution to obtain one of the following: customer
authorization, administrative subpoena or summons, search warrant,
judicial subpoena, or a formal written request.138 Additionally, federal
government officials must provide an individual with written notice of
the government’s intent to obtain the records, an explanation for
why the records are being sought, and an opportunity to object to a
financial institution supplying the records.139 However, there are many
exceptions to the notice requirement and instances where no notice is

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
Id. at 442.
See id. at 442–43 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1)).
See id.
12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422.
See id.
See id.; see also FED. RSRV., RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT: CONSUMER
COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 1
[hereinafter
RFPA HANDBOOK],
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/priv.pdf [https://perma.cc/GG94-FBJ9].
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required.140 Notably, the RFPA provides a significant allowance for
banks acting under the BSA.141 A bank is not required to inform a
customer when it discloses financial information under certain
circumstances, such as when it files a suspicious activity report with
the FinCEN.142 Generally, law enforcement investigations seek
financial transaction records to uncover hidden assets or suspicious
behavior that may reveal criminal activity or actors.143 Therefore, there
is an inevitable clash between privacy and transparency.
II. ANTIQUATED PRIVACY PROTECTION
Privacy concerns are generally rooted in the issue of trust, and
therefore, could be overcome through design choices and appropriate
legal frameworks that enhance trust in a retail CBDC.144 The
Federal Reserve’s unique access to individual information and
financial data from CBDC records could strengthen the anti-money
laundering and countering the financing of terrorism regimes and also
enable extraordinary government surveillance if left unchecked.
Hypothetically, government actors could abuse the Federal Reserve’s
newfound access to individual financial records for inappropriate
purposes.145 Therefore, privacy choices in a retail CBDC must protect
users’ information from abuse or needless government surveillance and
must allow permissible access to financial information for law
enforcement and regulatory compliance and supervision. Notably,
privacy protection must keep pace with existing and emerging
technological advances.
A. System of Records
The unique characteristics of databases further exacerbate the
concern that a retail CBDC system could be misused for unwarranted
access to personal information. The Privacy Act protects personally
140.
See RFPA HANDBOOK, supra note 139. The exceptions include disclosures not
identified with particular customers; disclosures pursuant to the functions of supervisory agencies;
disclosures in accordance with procedures under the Internal Revenue Code; disclosures pursuant
to any federal statute or rule, administrative subpoena, law enforcement inquiry, and judicial
proceedings; and disclosures relevant to a violation of the law. Id.
141.
See id.
142.
See id.
143.
See Money Laundering, supra note 119.
144.
See generally WERBACH, supra note 48, at 19–23 (explaining the general relationship
between privacy and trust).
145.
See generally Brookings Paper, supra note 32, at 38 (providing potential scenarios that
pose privacy risks).
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identifiable information contained in a system of records from which
data is retrieved by a personal identifier, such as a name and social
security number.146 It is probable that a retail CBDC database may
index individual information by a personal identifier given existing
BSA regulations and practices. The Federal Reserve (or a third-party
operator) would likely conduct regulatory due diligence for retail
CBDC accounts (or wallets) in a fashion similar to current procedures
at financial intermediaries with some potential allowances for any
financial inclusion goals. Moreover, a retail CBDC system could
also use pseudonymous identifiers to manage the identity of a
CBDC holder (or account).147 An individual’s identity would be
anonymous to the extent that a pseudonym (not an actual identity) is
shared during transactions.148 Additionally, a retail CBDC could serve
as a springboard for digital identity use cases.149 Therefore, the
determination of account identity versus individual identity in a
retail CBDC would be necessary to appropriately address privacy
concerns.150
Under existing BSA regulations, the Federal Reserve (or a
third-party operator) would be required to engage in recordkeeping of
retail CBDC transactions and store individual information for an
extensive period of time in a database.151 Protection under the Privacy
Act applies only to a database from which data is retrieved by a personal
identifier152—leaving wide latitude for an agency to choose nonpersonal
identifiers to circumvent many Privacy Act provisions. For instance,
retail CBDC users could be indexed in a system by IP address, which
does not identify a person on its own and must be linked to other
information to associate it with a specific individual. Therefore, the
Federal Reserve could bypass requirements under the Privacy Act by
indexing CBDC users by pseudonymous identifiers and still maintain
unprecedented amounts of individual data not subject to protective
measures against invasive government information practices. This

146.
See EPIC, supra note 92.
147.
See id. at 38–41.
148.
See id. at 38–41, 87 (explaining that pseudonymous CBDC accounts would still reveal
more information about transactions to central banks than existing systems do).
149.
See id. at 27–31.
150.
See Warren, supra note 30, at 36:10 (“The one thing I think that gets lost in the
conversation is the distinction between identity of the person and indeed the account.”); David
Treat, Senior Managing Dir., Accenture, Remarks at Digital Dollar Live, at 01:06:11 (July 21,
2020), in ACCENTURE, https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-130/Accenture-Digital-DollarLive-Video-Transcript.pdf#zoom=50 [https://perma.cc/U8DD-GNNT].
151.
Bank Secrecy Act, supra note 120.
152.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
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shortcoming demonstrates the inefficacy of Privacy Act protections in
an increasingly digital economy.153
B. Routine Uses and Information Sharing
The accessibility of retail CBDC records under the control of the
Federal Reserve would further exacerbate the shortcomings of the
personal identifier requirement under the Privacy Act when
considering existing government information-sharing practices.154 A
retail CBDC would create a database of financial transaction records
and other personal information under the control of the government.
Government agencies have the ability to access multiple public and
private databases and manipulate data to generate detailed insights
about individuals.155 Retail CBDC data in combination with data
analytic tools could augment other government databases through
existing information-sharing practices among government agencies.
This would create endless possibilities for the relationship between
CBDC data and government oversight. The FinCEN has acknowledged
that its collection of financial data from financial institutions under the
BSA has aided in anti-money laundering, countering the financing of
terrorism, and other financial crime investigations because law
enforcement and intelligence investigators can combine FinCEN data
with other collected data to draw more accurate identifications of
respective subjects from information such as banking patterns,
businesses and personal associations, communication methods,
previously unknown addresses, and travel patterns.156 With the advent
of technological innovations, a retail CBDC database under the control
of the Federal Reserve could bolster existing information-sharing
practices but needlessly track detailed personal information about
individuals. Therefore, the concern over privacy in a retail CBDC is not
only the government’s mere possession and disclosure of individual data
but also the potential for what the government can do with this data.157
The Federal Reserve could have unprecedented access to
individual financial data that the government would traditionally
access through a third party, such as a commercial bank. Ordinarily,
153.
See EPIC, supra note 92.
154.
Angelique Carson, So the Privacy Act Falls Short, but What to Do?, IAPP (Nov. 4, 2014),
https://iapp.org/news/a/so-the-privacy-act-falls-short-but-what-to-do/
[https://perma.cc/5HKWH6MP].
155.
See id.
156.
The Value of FinCEN Data, FINCEN, https://www.fincen.gov/resources/law-enforcement/case-examples [https://perma.cc/EZ7W-S5P2] (last visited Mar. 17, 2021).
157.
See id.
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the federal government has access to financial records through lawful
procedures or voluntary information-sharing protocols with banks
under the BSA.158 Information-sharing practices could be especially ripe
for misuse under the routine use exception to certain Privacy Act
protections if government entities utilize the exception as a backdoor
opportunity to compile individual financial data from retail CBDC
records. The routine use exception would allow government agencies to
extract retail CBDC information from the Federal Reserve’s database
for uses that could be construed as “compatible” with the purpose for
which CBDC records are collected. A compatible use under the Act’s
routine use exception could encompass whatever the Federal Reserve
deems is “functionally equivalent” or “necessary and proper” for a
purpose for which retail CBDC data is collected.159 Thus, a retail
CBDC could be programmed to communicate endless information to
government entities as long as the purpose for an entity’s access to the
information could be construed as compatible with the Federal
Reserve’s purpose for collecting CBDC records. For instance, the
“collection” of CBDC records could constitute the information that is
generated by the base programming underpinning the retail CBDC
infrastructure itself. Additional smart contracts embedded in a CBDC
for different uses, such as regulatory supervision, could support
“compatible uses” of information. Therefore, the programmability of a
retail CBDC could constitute a new, innovative method for information
sharing. The purpose for collecting CBDC records would essentially
circumscribe what uses are compatible under the routine use exception.
Therefore, enumerated purposes for collecting CBDC records would not
only define use cases but would also be a way to prospectively craft
information-sharing practices.
1. Wavering Privacy Protection
Information-sharing practices in the context of a retail CBDC
could pose a concern for individuals not currently protected under the
Privacy Act. The Act does not expressly protect personally identifiable
information of individuals who are not US citizens or permanent
residents.160 Traditionally, federal agencies have adopted internal
policies to extend Privacy Act protections to noncitizens and

158.
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422.
159.
See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST.: OFF. OF PRIV. & CIV. LIBERTIES, supra note 94.
160.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2) (“[T]he term “individual” means a citizen of the United States
or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence”).
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nonpermanent residents under certain circumstances.161 However, on
January 25, 2017, then-President Trump issued an executive order that
discouraged these internal privacy policies and ordered federal agencies
to exclude individuals who are not US citizens nor lawful permanent
residents from Privacy Act protections.162 The executive order contained
immigration enforcement priorities and encouraged more information
sharing about noncitizens and nonpermanent residents to facilitate
immigration enforcement.163 The absence of express protection for
noncitizens and nonpermanent residents leaves a segment of the
population in a precarious position because noncitizens and
nonpermanent residents can be subject to invasive government
information-sharing practices without any legal recourse. The lack of
protection under the Privacy Act would deter noncitizens and
nonpermanent residents from participating in a retail CBDC payments
system and would further marginalize them from the mainstream
financial system. This could have a domino effect and deter others
who have relations (social, business, etc.) with noncitizens and
nonpermanent residents from using a retail CBDC payments system to
avoid compromising the privacy of noncitizens and nonpermanent
residents. Therefore, the Privacy Act should be amended to expressly
protect noncitizens and nonpermanent residents.
III. PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF RETAIL CBDC
The privacy policy of a retail CBDC under the control of the
Federal Reserve should be responsive to technological innovations
and the sociopolitical reality of privacy. The novelty of a retail CBDC
creates regulatory uncertainty around the Federal Reserve’s
appropriate role in safeguarding individual privacy and bolstering
regulatory innovation. A retail CBDC—whether account-based or
token-based—would provide the government direct and real-time
access to personal information and financial data. The scale and success
of a retail CBDC system relies on trust.164 The public must trust that
161.
Stephen Nattrass, Executive Order Removes US Privacy Act Protection for Canadians,
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Mar. 2017), https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/01bc866e/executive-order-removes-us-iprivacy-acti-protection-for-canadians
[https://perma.cc/QK37-Q9VD].
162.
See id. (noting that citizens of EU countries are entitled to protection under the
Privacy Act pursuant to the Judicial Redress Act of 2015); see also Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed.
Reg. 8,799, 8,802 (Jan. 30, 2017).
163.
Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8,000–01.
164.
See Daniel J. Solove, The Myth of the Privacy Paradox, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 39
(2021) (“Trust is also essential in our personal and commercial relationships.”). See generally
WERBACH, supra note 48, at 20–25 (explaining the importance of trust in human conduct).
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the government will not misuse CBDC data and the government must
trust that the CBDC system will not empower bad actors.165 Thus, a
proper privacy framework for a retail CBDC would help facilitate
integrity within the system to build trust among the participants and
operators of the CBDC system.166 Broader protections for privacy may
be required as the general public’s privacy expectations shift with
society’s increasing awareness of the impact of data. Amending the
Privacy Act in the context of a retail CBDC that is under the control of
the Federal Reserve could harmonize individual privacy and regulatory
innovation. Alternatively, a new regulatory framework informed by the
Privacy Act that implements the forgoing refinements to the Privacy
Act and responds to the arising privacy demands of a retail CBDC could
better serve privacy concerns, enhance transparency, and promote
equal access. Furthermore, defining rules that govern the use of CBDC
data could promote transparency in the payments system.167
A. Smart Money, Big Data, and Civil Liberties
Conceptualizing privacy as the mere possession of information
may no longer be appropriate in the context of a retail CBDC that is
under the control of the Federal Reserve.168 Technological innovations,
such as big data, can transform the mere possession of CBDC data into
a mechanism from which the government extrapolates data-informed
conclusions for decision-making. Big data maximizes computation
power and algorithmic accuracy to identify patterns and generate
insights from large data sets.169 Big data flourishes in large data sets
because the abundance of data offers more accurate and precise
intelligence and knowledge.170 Regulating only the possession of CBDC
records could create absurd results for personal privacy in the age of big
data. For instance, government officials could use retail CBDC
transaction records that include references to social movements (e.g.,
donations) and combine this information with data from other agency
databases, public records, private databases, government intelligence
systems, social media accounts, or any other available information
system to potentially uncover political dissidence, identify social
activists, undermine constitutionally protected activity, or support the
165.
See WERBACH, supra note 48, at 20–21.
166.
See id.
167.
See id. at 27.
168.
See Carson, supra note 154.
169.
Danah Boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a
Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO . COMM. & SOC’Y 662, 663 (2012).
170.
See id.
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undertaking of coercive measures to squash public expression (e.g.,
freeze CBDC accounts or wallets to block financial support for
protests).171
The combination of retail CBDC records and big data
could bolster dataveillance on a mass scale.172 Dataveillance tracks
metadata—which is essentially data about data.173 Financial records
can reveal numerous details and insights about an individual’s life,
such as medical conditions, political affiliations, and location.174
Currently, private firms use this data to predict consumer behavior
and future company performance.175 Lenders use financial data to
predict likelihoods of divorce, travel patterns, and creditworthiness.176
Direct access to financial records could aid the government in
curbing tax evasion and monitoring monetary expenditures because
the federal government could similarly employ predictive analytics
with retail CBDC records to identify an individual’s behavior and
movement. This could also detect suspicious activities and be
advantageous to BSA compliance and enforcement. However, detailed
analytics could also have far-reaching consequences for individual
privacy. CBDC records could be repurposed to support government
surveillance under current privacy laws and could even be unhinged to
the extent that such surveillance targets vulnerable segments of the
population.
The unchecked repurposing of retail CBDC records to augment
other government data sets could increase the likelihood of racial
profiling and other arbitrary means of targeting segments of the
population. The incidence of US government surveillance targeted at
171.
See Allie Funk, How Domestic Spying Tools Undermine Racial Justice Protests,
FREEDOM HOUSE (June 22, 2020), https://freedomhouse.org/article/how-domestic-spying-tools-undermine-racial-justice-protests [https://perma.cc/CB7K-P3AF]; Nigeria: Punitive Financial Moves
Against Protesters, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 13, 2020, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/
2020/11/13/nigeria-punitive-financial-moves-against-protesters [https://perma.cc/N9CA-WCMR]
(discussing an example of a punitive financial measure undertaken by the Central Bank of Nigeria
to suppress EndSARS protests in 2020).
172.
See April White, A Brief History of Surveillance in America, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Apr.
2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/brief-history-surveillance-america-180968399/
[https://perma.cc/UB2F-G8FW].
173.
See id.
174.
Benjamin Powers & Marc Hochstein, Could a Digital Dollar Compete on Privacy? Fed
Chairman Powell Hints It Might, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/could-a-digital-dollarcompete-on-privacy-fed-chairman-powell-hints-it-might
[https://perma.cc/CLY6-J67R]
(last
updated Feb. 13, 2020, 12:05 PM).
175.
See id.
176.
See Is the Credit Scoring Written in Your DNA?, FIN AI (Sept. 15, 2017),
https://www.finai.com/en/newsroom/is-the-credit-scoring-written-in-your-dna/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/23V7-9N58].
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social movements, activists, or ethnic minority communities—such as
the civil rights movement,177 Black Lives Matter organizers or
supporters,178 and AMEMSA (Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim, and
South Asian) communities following 9/11179—demonstrates the need
to not only safeguard the possession of retail CBDC records but also
the use of records. The failure to regulate how individual CBDC
records can be used would ignore potentially harmful effects of big
data, such as the generation of various insights about individuals or
the unethical use of data aggregation to segment and target
individuals for unspecified purposes.180 Prescribing permissible uses of
retail CBDC records would ensure a retail CBDC system is not
repurposed to undermine fundamental rights or arbitrarily monitor
individuals absent suspicion of criminal activity. Moreover, a privacy
framework must keep pace with technological advancements in data
analytics.
The relationship between individuals and the government also
warrants consideration.181 The spirit of the Fourth Amendment
demonstrates that the government stands in a different position than
private entities, such as financial institutions.182 A financial institution
monitoring financial transactions within its system is required by law
177.
See Noa Yachot, History Shows Activists Should Fear the Surveillance State, ACLU
(Oct. 27, 2017, 3:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/history-shows-activists-should-fear-surveillance [https://perma.cc/D3C8-X5VH].
178.
See, e.g., Funk, supra note 171; George Joseph, Exclusive: Feds Regularly Monitored
Black Lives Matter Since Ferguson, INTERCEPT (July 24, 2015, 2:50 PM), https://theintercept.com/
2015/07/24/documents-show-department-homeland-security-monitoring-black-lives-matter-sinceferguson/ [https://perma.cc/6Z35-ZS9N]; George Joseph, Undercover Police Have Regularly Spied
on Black Lives Matter Activists in New York, INTERCEPT (Aug. 18, 2015, 5:27 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/08/18/undercover-police-spied-on-ny-black-lives-matter/
[https://perma.cc/U3TL9NKY] (reporting on undercover police officers attending Black Lives Matters protests in New
York and tracking protestors’ movements). Compare Wendi C. Thomas, Police Have Been Spying
on Black Reporters and Activists for Years. I Know Because I’m One of Them, NEIMAN LAB
(June 10, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.niemanlab.org/2020/06/police-have-been-spying-on-blackreporters-and-activists-for-years-i-know-because-im-one-of-them/ [https://perma.cc/XB6B-65FT],
with Facebook Letter to Memphis Police Department on Fake Accounts, EFF (Sept. 19,
2018), https://www.eff.org/document/facebook-letter-memphis-police-department-fake-accounts
[https://perma.cc/7Y9U-AQHM] (discussing an example of the Memphis Police Department using
Facebook for surveillance of individuals for political reasons).
179.
See CITY & CNTY. OF SF HUM. RTS. COMM’N, COMMUNITY CONCERNS OF
SURVEILLANCE, RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS PROFILING OF ARAB, MIDDLE EASTERN, MUSLIM, AND
SOUTH ASIAN COMMUNITIES AND POTENTIAL REACTIVATION OF SFPD INTELLIGENCE
GATHERING (2010), https://sf-hrc.org//sites/default/files/Documents/HRC_Publications/Articles/
AMEMSA_Report_Adopted_by_HRC_022411.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9X3-5Q27].
180.
See Solove, supra note 164, at 42–44, 49–50.
181.
Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1156–57 (2002).
182.
See id.
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to do so183 and will not automatically implicate due process concerns.184
However, the government’s direct access to such information could more
readily be used against individuals absent procedural safeguards.185 On
one hand, a retail CBDC is a voluntary option like a private-sector
financial service; therefore, individuals will have a choice to use private
financial services in lieu of a retail CBDC payments system. On the
other hand, a retail CBDC is a public option slated to transform the US
payments system in hopes of wide adoption for success. Therefore, the
breadth of power at the government’s disposal—despite an individual’s
freedom to choose to use a retail CBDC—can be employed to control
individual behavior and effectively reduce a retail CBDC to an
authoritative tool that infringes upon civil liberties. A privacy
framework must (1) prescribe what information the government should
know and when the government should know this information and
(2) provide stringent liability provisions for the misuse of retail CBDC
data to limit the imposition of arbitrary state power. The programmable
capabilities of a retail CBDC should also be limited to purposes that
would bolster economic benefits. Technological innovations should be
used appropriately to ensure the integrity of a retail CBDC system. The
current BSA regime demands some intrusion into privacy to ensure the
integrity of the US financial system. Thus, retail CBDC users would
engage in a “trust tradeoff.”186 CBDC users would enjoy the benefits of
the payments system (e.g., reliability and efficiency) in exchange for the
cessation of some privacy to ensure the integrity of a CBDC system.187
CBDC would be a voluntary, public option that supplements physical
cash and private-sector payments options. Thus, CBDC users would
also have to trust that their information would not be misused by
government actors to willingly engage in the aforementioned tradeoff
in a retail CBDC system.188

183.
See Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5311, amended by USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No.
107-56, tit. III, 115 Stat. 272, 296 (2001).
184.
See The Right to Financial Privacy Act, EPIC, https://epic.org/privacy/rfpa/#:~:text=
The%20reaction%20to%20the%20Supreme,records%20maintained%20by%20financial%20institutions [https://perma.cc/S653-3QBQ] (last visited Mar. 17, 2021) (explaining the purpose of the
Right to the Financial Privacy Act and procedural requirements for bank records).
185.
See Solove, supra note 181, at 1156.
186.
See WERBACH, supra note 48, at 28 (conceptualizing “trust trade-off”).
187.
See id.
188.
See id.
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B. Permissible Vantage Point
Retail CBDC records under the control of the Federal Reserve
would likely classify as a “system of records” under the Privacy Act and
be subject to safeguards that protect personally identifiable information
that is accessible from a retail CBDC ledger. A retail CBDC payments
system raises the concern of mass or targeted government surveillance
because systems can potentially give rise to a more detailed and
systematic compilation of personal data about individuals.189 The
system of records classification would protect individual information
from inappropriate information-gathering and information-sharing
practices between government agencies by requiring government
entities to undergo certain procedures before accessing personal
information.
Additionally, information generated from a retail CBDC system
is collected by default (i.e., location, vendor, transaction amount, item,
etc.) and not necessarily by consent.190 A retail CBDC reliant on ledger
technology could use privacy-enhancing technology to limit the type of
information that is exposed to the Federal Reserve, but this does not
eliminate the fact that some information must be collected to record
transactions. Moreover, more information may be required to comply
with existing BSA recordkeeping standards.
A proper privacy framework could manage access to the direct
vantage point that a retail CBDC would provide to government officials.
Limiting the availability of the routine use exception under the
Privacy Act for retail CBDC records could help establish a permissible
vantage point for government actors. Since agencies establish their own
routine uses and thereby determine the compatibility of such uses,191 it
is crucial that a privacy framework define permissible uses of retail
CBDC records to provide parameters around the routine use. The
RFPA provides relevant guidance on procedural protections that can
augment current disclosure safeguards under the Privacy Act.192 For
instance, under the RFPA, government authorities seeking customer
financial records from a financial institution must obtain one of
the following: customer authorization; administrative subpoena or
summons; search warrant; judicial subpoena; or a formal,
administrative written request. Therefore, the Privacy Act should be

189.
See Solove, supra note 181, at 1156.
190.
See id.
191.
See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST.: OFF. OF PRIV. & CIV. LIBERTIES, supra note 94.
192.
See Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3401; see also The Right
to Financial Privacy Act, supra note 184.
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amended to ensure that government access to individual financial
information from retail CBDC records is subject to the same
procedural requirements. Additionally, more stringent liability
provisions than those under the Privacy Act should be implemented
for the unauthorized use, disclosure, and access of retail CBDC
records. Regulatory compliance, such as currency transaction reports193
and suspicious activity reports,194 necessitates some flexibility in the
access to retail CBDC records. Therefore, the routine use exception
could capture regulatory compliance under the BSA. Additionally, the
Federal Reserve should provide actual notice to retail CBDC users
about its information practices—such as the nature and extent of
information sharing for regulatory purposes. The Privacy Act (or a
new regulatory framework) must create a permissible vantage point for
government actors and limit needlessly invasive information-sharing
practices across government agencies. Failure to balance individual
privacy expectations and government interests could discourage wide
adoption of a retail CBDC, marginalize segments of the population, and
erode public trust in the government.
C. Equal Protection
Motivations for a retail CBDC include reducing reliance on
financial intermediaries and expanding access to capital. The plain
text of the Privacy Act precludes protection for individuals who are not
citizens or permanent residents of the United States. This would
only serve to discourage and effectively exclude their participation
in a retail CBDC system. The failure to extend protection to
individuals who are not citizens or permanent residents—particularly
undocumented immigrants—would undermine the trust and
transparency in the system by maintaining a lawful workaround for
inappropriate information practices. Additionally, it is antithetical to
the CBDC goal of financial inclusion to further marginalize a
segment of the US population for whom the private sector currently
provides alternative means of access to the financial system.
Therefore, it is imperative that the Privacy Act (or a new regulatory
framework) expressly protects individuals who are not citizens or
permanent residents of the United States. Additionally, the
privacy framework governing CBDC records should incorporate a
rule similar to the IRS’s policy and prohibit the disclosure of an

193.
reports).
194.

31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2021) (outlining the filing obligations for currency transaction
Id. § 1010.320.
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individual’s immigration status, which may be revealed or
speculated from Know Your Customer procedures or retail CBDC
transaction data.
D. Innovative Regulatory Compliance and Oversight
Retail CBDC has the potential to transform financial regulatory
compliance and enforcement. A retail CBDC’s panoramic view of
financial transactions could enable the creation of non-fungible
money.195 Monetary policy can be implemented in a CBDC to impose
conditions, such as spending limits on “helicopter money.”196 Helicopter
money is a form of quantitative easing that involves a monetary
authority distributing central bank money directly to the population in
lieu of money distribution by financial intermediaries.197 For instance,
the Federal Reserve could utilize a retail CBDC for helicopter money to
more effectively ensure that households have access to government
stimulus funds during the ongoing pandemic or any other economic
crisis.198 The ability to control money in a retail CBDC system would
not only aid monetary policy but also enable regulators to implement
more risk-based approaches to BSA enforcement. Therefore, the privacy
framework of a retail CBDC must strike a proper balance between
innovative financial regulation and individual privacy. This should
involve implementing tiered access to CBDC records such that
individual information is not indiscriminately disclosed to government
actors.199 A tiered access approach to disclosure could be captured under
procedural requirements for government access to individual records
and the routine use exception under the Privacy Act. The nature of the
disclosure should implicate which requirement or exception is
warranted. For example, if a government entity is seeking individual
information in pursuit of a legitimate law enforcement purpose,
then permissible means enumerated under the RFPA—such as a
subpoena—should govern the disclosure. On the other hand, the
Federal Reserve may aid the FinCEN under the BSA by providing

195.
See Brookings Paper, supra note 32, at 47–48, 64–68.
196.
See id. at 62–64.
197.
Press Release, Simon Youel, Positive Money, Issue Digital Cash or Lose Trust in
Money, Report Warns (Apr. 23, 2020), https://positivemoney.org/2020/04/press-release-issue-digital-cash-or-lose-trust-in-money-report-warns/ [https://perma.cc/QPZ4-XXCR].
198.
See id.
199.
Sriram Darbha & Rakesh Arora, Privacy in CBDC Technology, BANK OF CAN. (June
2020), https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2020/06/staff-analytical-note-2020-9/ [https://perma.cc/LG84PWVJ].
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insights from retail CBDC records not tied to an individual identity via
the routine use exception.
IV. REIMAGINING THE US PRIVACY FRAMEWORK FOR A RETAIL CBDC
The increased digital transformation of payments creates
unique privacy demands. Though a retail CBDC has the promise to
transform the way in which individuals transact, it must respect
privacy limits. The Privacy Act of 1974 is a legal solution that could
balance privacy in a retail CBDC. Alternatively, a new regulatory
framework informed by the Privacy Act and aforementioned
refinements to the Act in Parts I and II could be instituted to more
effectively protect personal data in a retail CBDC system. Whether the
Privacy Act is applied (and amended) or a new regulatory framework is
adopted to protect retail CBDC records will largely depend on future
insights from ongoing exploration of the technology, benefits and risks,
and governance of a US retail CBDC. Moreover, the privacy framework
governing a retail CBDC should (1) classify CBDC records as a database
(or “system of records”), (2) prescribe permissible uses of retail CBDC
records, particularly as it concerns government information-sharing
practices of retail CBDC data, (3) impose similar procedural
requirements to those under the RFPA for government access to
individual CBDC records, (4) impose more stringent liability provisions
than those under the Privacy Act for the misuse of retail CBDC data,
(5) expressly protect individuals who are neither US citizens nor
permanent residents, and (6) provide flexibility for innovative
regulatory compliance and enforcement. Notably, the distinctive
features of a retail CBDC system may necessitate an entirely new
framework to protect individual privacy in a retail CBDC.200 A new
regulatory framework that incorporates remedies for shortcomings of
the Privacy Act and addresses the emergence of new financial
technologies would be more applicable and adaptable to innovations in
payments.201
A privacy framework that defines permissible parameters in
the collection, access, and use of retail CBDC data would enhance
public transparency and protect individuals while providing flexibility
for legitimate law enforcement, financial regulation, and innovation.
Balancing the inherent tension between privacy and transparency of
user identity and transactions within a retail CBDC system under the

200.
Yesha Yadav & Chris Brummer, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J.
235, 264 (2019).
201.
See id.

854

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 23:4:821

control of the Federal Reserve would facilitate the successful
implementation of a widely accessible retail CBDC that embraces
technological innovation and fosters financial inclusion.
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